Зарегистрироваться
Восстановить пароль
FAQ по входу

Brandt F., Conitzer V., Endriss U., Lang J., Procaccia A.D. (eds.) Handbook of Computational Social Choice

  • Файл формата pdf
  • размером 4,28 МБ
  • Добавлен пользователем
  • Описание отредактировано
Brandt F., Conitzer V., Endriss U., Lang J., Procaccia A.D. (eds.) Handbook of Computational Social Choice
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. — 554 p.
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
Chapters were written by many prominent members of the computational social choice community.
Accessible to readers from a variety of disciplines, especially computer science, economics, and mathematics.
The authoritative reference work on computational social choice.
'The book offers to noneconomists an outstanding self-contained introduction to normative themes in contemporary economics and to economists a thorough discussion of the computational limits of their art. But I also recommend it to anyone with a taste for axiomatics: it is replete with new and open questions that will be with us for some time.' Hervé Moulin, from the Foreword.
Foreword
Introduction to computational social choice
Voting:
Introduction to the theory of voting r
Tournament solutions
Weighted tournament solutions r
Dodgson's rule and Young's rule
Barriers to manipulation in voting
Control and bribery in voting
Rationalizations of voting rules
Voting in combinatorial domains
Incomplete information and communication in voting
Fair Allocation:
Introduction to the theory of fair allocation
Fair allocation of indivisible goods
Cake cutting algorithms
Coalition Formation:
Matching under preferences
Hedonic games
Weighted voting games
Additional Topics:
Judgment aggregation
The axiomatic approach and the internet
Knockout tournaments
  • Чтобы скачать этот файл зарегистрируйтесь и/или войдите на сайт используя форму сверху.
  • Регистрация